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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-2274 
____________ 
 
JOSEPH SCHIMES, 
 
                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMS BARRETT, individually and in his official capacity as 
PRESIDENT OF THE CITY OF SCRANTON NON UNIFORM PENSION BOARD; 
CHRISTOPHER DOHERTY, individually and in his official capacity as 
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF SCRANTON; 
GARY DIBILEO, individually and in his official capacity as 
PRESIDENT OF SCRANTON CITY COUNCIL; 
JUDY GATELLI, individually and in her official capacity as 
PRESIDENT OF THE SCRANTON CITY COUNCIL; 
ROSEANN NOVEMBRINO, individually and in her official capacity as 
SCRANTON CITY CONTROLLER; OFFICER JAY SAUNDERS; LEN KRESEFSKI; 
JERRY PHILLIPS; KATHLEEN RUANE; SHERRY FANUCCI; 
CITY OF SCRANTON NON UNIFORM PENSION BOARD; CITY OF SCRANTON; 
MICHAEL T. SAVITSKY, individually and in his official capacity as 
SOLICITOR FOR THE CITY OF SCRANTON NON UNIFORM PENSION BOARD; 
MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-07-cv-00872) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
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(Filed: April 12, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Schimes appeals the final order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of Thomas Barrett, 
Chris Doherty, Gary DiBileo, Judy Gatelli, Roseann Novembrino, Jay Saunders, Len 
Kresefski, Jerry Phillips, Kathleen Ruane, Sherry Fanucci, the City of Scranton Non-
Uniform Pension Board (the “Pension Board”), City of Scranton (“Scranton”), Michael 
Savitsky, and Margolis Edelstein (collectively, the “City Appellees”).  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and legal history 
of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
 Joseph Schimes was an employee of Scranton, and a member of the non-uniform 
clerical workers‟ union for twenty-two years.  In the last week of 2002, with the 
collective bargaining agreement between the union and Scranton set to expire, Scranton 
made a one-time buyout offer of retirement with healthcare benefits.  It provided: 
A onetime offer is hereby approved to members of the non-uniform pension 
plan provided that the member was an active employee of the City of 
Scranton up to December 31, 2002, had worked for the City of Scranton for 
twenty-five (25) years or more as of December 31, 2002, is less than 55 
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years of age as of December 31, 2002, and provided that said member 
retired by December 31, 2002. 
 
(App. at 544.)  Schimes did not have twenty-five years of service, but he believed that he 
could purchase additional years of pension time.  Article XXXIII, Section 3(D) permitted 
bargaining unit members with more than twenty-one years of actual service to purchase 
up to ten years of pension service.  (App. at 239.)  When he asked for a pension 
application from Thomas Barrett, who was then the President of the Pension Board, 
Barrett informed him that additional time could not be purchased in conjunction with the 
early retirement offer so Schimes would not be eligible.  Notwithstanding this 
conversation, Schimes submitted his application and retired. 
 By letter dated January 13, 2003, the Pension Board notified Schimes that he did 
not qualify for the one-time early retirement offer.  Schimes subsequently requested that 
he be reinstated to his job, but his request for reinstatement was denied.  Accordingly, he 
was retired without a pension or health benefits. 
 Schimes sought to appeal his denial of a pension and benefits.  To do so, he 
attended Pension Board meetings and repeatedly requested reconsideration of his pension 
application.  Finally, on March 24, 2004, the Pension Board acted and voted to deny 
Schimes a pension and benefits on the basis that he had not qualified for the early 
retirement offer.  
 Having exhausted his process with the Pension Board, Schimes filed a petition in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (the “Court of Common Pleas”).  
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The Court of Common Pleas ordered the Pension Board to reconsider Schimes‟s 
application and to conduct a hearing where he could offer evidence.  At that hearing, the 
Pension Board incorrectly relied upon language of an ordinance that was passed after 
Schimes had retired, which made it expressly clear that people in Schimes‟s circumstance 
could not purchase additional years of credit.  After both sides presented evidence, the 
Pension Board again denied Schimes a pension. 
 Schimes appealed this determination to the Court of Common Pleas.  It reversed 
the Pension Board‟s decision and awarded Schimes a pension.  The Pension Board 
appealed, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas decision.  
On January 24, 2007, the Pension Board voted not to appeal the Commonwealth Court 
decision and to begin paying Schimes a pension. 
 Upset that it had taken four years to receive a pension, Schimes filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  His complaint 
alleged that the City Appellees had, among other allegations, committed substantive due 
process violations, procedural due process violations, and unconstitutionally interfered 
with his contract rights. 
 The City Appellees filed a motion to dismiss all of Schimes‟s claims.  The District 
Court granted the motion to dismiss for the procedural due process claim, but denied it 
for the remaining claims.  After discovery was completed, the City Appellees filed a 
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motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims.  The District Court granted 
this motion. 
 Schimes filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Schimes‟s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over grants of motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment.  Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 We will affirm a District Court‟s dismissal of a claim unless the plaintiff has pled: 
Sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 
 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citiations 
omitted).  The complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongful conduct].”  Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).  If the plaintiff fails to demonstrate any set 
of facts in support of that claim which would entitle it to relief, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s dismissal.  Id. 
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 We will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment if the record shows 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Dee, 549 F.3d at 229. 
III. 
 Schimes appeals the District Court‟s disposition of three claims.  First, Schimes 
argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his procedural due process claim.  
Second, Schimes argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Barrett on his substantive due process claim.  Third, Schimes argues that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to Barrett on his Contracts Clause claim.  We 
discuss each contention in turn. 
 First, Schimes argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his procedural due 
process claim.  The District Court dismissed this claim because the process that the 
Plaintiff Appellees used was sufficient, as can be evidenced by Schimes‟ successful 
pursuit of his pension. 
 To state a claim for a deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege 
that:  (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that was encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of “life, liberty, and property”; and (2) the procedure 
afforded to him did not provide due process of law.  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 
F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 The parties do not dispute whether Schimes‟s interest in his pension was a 
protected property interest, but instead disagree about whether the City Appellees 
provided adequate due process. 
 We have determined that “a state provides adequate due process when it provides 
„reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative body.‟”  Bello v. 
Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Cohen v. City of Phila., 736 F.2d 
81, 86 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 Here, Schimes was able to appeal the decisions of the Pension Board to the state 
courts.  He raised his claims, received a hearing, and ultimately prevailed.  The process 
afforded Schimes with sufficient protection.  The fact that there could have been an easier 
or better process does not mean that sufficient process was not provided. 
 We will affirm the District Court‟s grant of the dismissal of Schimes‟s procedural 
due process claim. 
 Second, Schimes argues that the District Court erred by granting summary 
judgment to Barrett on his substantive due process claim.  The District Court concluded 
that, “[e]ven assuming that [Schimes] ha[d] a protected property interest in his pension, 
he has not produced any evidence of conduct by the defendants that would rise to the 
level of a substantive due process violation.”  (App. at 42.) 
 For a plaintiff to succeed on a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant acted in a way that shocks the conscience.  City of Sacramento v. 
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Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998).  “Conduct intended to injure in some way 
unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to 
the conscience-shocking level.”  Id. at 849. 
 Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Schimes, the evidence that he 
offered is insufficient to support this claim.  The Pension Board was entitled to litigate its 
position in the state courts.  The fact that its position was ultimately incorrect fails to 
meet the high burden of “shocking the conscience.”  There is no evidence that the 
Pension Board litigated in bad faith in order to discriminate against Schimes or to injure 
him in some unjustifiable manner.  Additionally, there is no evidence that the City 
Appellees took the legal position they did in bad faith or from a desire to injure.  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court: 
A jury could not conclude that such behavior shocked the conscience.  The 
city‟s position, supported by advice from its solicitor, was that plaintiff was 
not eligible for a pension under their 2002 offer.  Lower courts concluded 
that the City was wrong, and the City appealed.  While [Schimes] was 
ultimately vindicated, the fact that the city acted in what it perceived to be 
its legal and financial interests does not demonstrate the sort of egregious 
conduct that would shock the conscience. 
 
(App. at 44.) 
 We will therefore affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to the 
City Appellees on Schimes‟s substantive due process claim. 
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 Third, Schimes argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
to Barrett on his Contracts Clause claim.  The District Court determined that the City 
Appellees did not substantially impair Schimes‟s contract. 
 The Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art I, § 10, of the Constitution, provides that, 
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”  A party 
seeking to prevail on a Contracts Clause claim “must demonstrate that a „change in state 
law has operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.‟”  Transport 
Workers Union, Local 290 v. SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting General 
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)).  This means, for a plaintiff to win, a 
court must determine “(1) [that there] there is a contractual relationship; (2) . . . [that] a 
[subsequent] change in a law . . . impaired that contractual relationship; and (3) . . . [that] 
the impairment is substantial.”  Id.  If these elements are met, the court must still 
determine “whether the law at issue has a legitimate and important public purpose and 
whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship was 
reasonable and appropriate in light of that purpose.”  Id. 
 In 2002, Schimes accepted Scranton‟s early retirement offer.  At that time, it was 
unclear whether retirees who accepted early retirement offers could purchase additional 
years of service credit.  In 2003, the City passed an ordinance that provided that early 
retirees could not purchase additional years of service to obtain early retirement.  The 
Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, concluded that the statute 
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did not apply to Schimes and that he could purchase additional years of service credit.  
As the statute did not interfere with Schimes‟s contract, he cannot meet the second prong 
of the Transport Workers Union, Local 290 test. 
 We affirm the decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to Barrett 
on Schimes‟s Contract Clause claim. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
